This study examines the role of auctioneer's strategy used in determining pricing at art auctions. It characterizes the role of auctioneers, prices that the paintings were sold at and tests a series of hypotheses about their behavior. This is done using pricing data from an auction of paintings. It examines the relationship between the auctioneer's estimates and realized prices. It determines whether the auctioneer and the market evaluate different attributes of different paintings differently and finally, an analysis is undertaken on the determinants of prices in the art market as suggested by hedonic regression.
Introduction
Auctions are an ancient form of trading, buoyant markets in action and accounting for a huge mass of economic activity. Auctions are another way of marketing either single distinctive items such as artwork or multiple units of a homogeneous item. Most recently they have expanded from being held in traditional locations to being held over the Internet. However, there has been relatively little work on marketing in an auction setting. A number of questions from a marketing perspective are yet to be explored, which includes: Should strategic considerations influence the estimate of prices the auctioneer provides ahead of the auction? Should the auctioneer provide other promotional material before the auction? Are there other ways the auctioneer can design the auction, keeping in mind the consumer's bidding behavior, to maximize revenue to the sellers? This paper characterizes the role of auctioneers and consumers in auctions, drawing on related literature in consumer behavior, marketing and economics. It highlights the features of auction design, the role of pricing, particularly when consumers have imperfect information on the nature of the item for auction, and how other features of auctions interact with consumer behavior in auctions. It then analyses the marketing strategy, pricing and outcomes of an art auction.
In the next section, a review is undertaken on previous literature. The data is introduced and the econometric framework used in the analysis is presented. Then follows the discussion of the results and finally, the conclusions are stated.
Previous Literature
Previous literature on auctions is examined for two purposes. First, to provide a theoretical framework for the empirical analysis and secondly to highlight the gaps in the existing literature by understanding interactions between consumer behavior and auctioneer strategies. Lessons are drawn from the large theoretical and empirical literature on auctions in economics (see Klemperer, 1998; Milgrom, 1989) , consumer behavior and marketing. Finally, conclusions are provided with several issues relevant for our application -the art market.
Consumer Behavior
This section characterizes the consumer in relation to their participation at auctions. All participants in an auction place a valuation on all items presented for sale.
How these valuations are formed is important for how effective different auctioneer strategies are. Therefore, in the first instance a discussion is provided on how to characterize these valuations and where they come from. Secondly, how participating in an auction may influence the consumer's valuation and behavior.
Economic theory has focused on two generalizations about how consumers value items presented for an auction -the item has a common value or a private value (Klemperer, 1998; Nanda et al, 1997) . The item is said to have a common value if all consumers place the same valuation on the item when they possess it
1 . An item is said to have private value if consumers have different values for the product after purchase (e.g. Vickery, 1961) . McAffee and McMillan (1987) indicate these two cases can be interpreted as polar cases. In an application, there will undoubtedly be common components and individual components. What determines the relative importance of these components? The economics literature generally does not consider this but assumes each person independently forms his or her own valuations, as described above. At the other extreme are the arguments proposed by Woo (1995) who believes valuations are largely derived through socialization. For example, how consumers' perceive a particular artist, will have a positive/negative perception on their artwork. This is one argument in support of a largely common component in individual valuations.
However, it is not always appropriate to assume the consumer arrives at the auction with a fixed valuation of each item for sale. Consumers can face difficulty when trying to assess value when the object is, for example, particularly complex, or the consumer has imperfect information on the origins of the object or there are marketing inefficiencies. The consumer may suggest valuation of an object by using various sorts of information e.g. the predicted price, or the predicted and actual prices of similar items. This may affect the valuation of an item of a consumer. Specifically, where the consumer has imperfect information on the quality of the object, then price may act as a signal of quality and assist the consumer to form their valuation of the particular item for sale. Likewise, in an auction, other bids may also reveal information about the common value of the item and hence influence the valuation for each consumer.
Arguments for price being a critical decision-making factor can also be seen in much of the theory that can be drawn from consumer behavior. Alternative evaluation is the third step in a decision-making process and it is the process through which we compare and contrast different solutions to the same market place problem. To assess benefits offered by products and services consumers use a range of evaluative criteria that can be tangible such as price, features, quality, convenience or intangible such as status, image or feelings associated with ownership or use. Price is for most consumers 1 Even though an item has a common value to all consumers, different consumers place different bids for the item as they have different information on this value before the item is purchased.
and in many buying situations the most significant influencer in the alternative evaluation (Berkman et al, 1997) .
Prices, as discussed above, is just one set of information that the consumer can use to improve their valuation of the items for auction. Other information may well be just as important as demonstrated in the work of Monroe and Krishnan (1985) and Monroe (1988, 1989) . These authors examine the effects of information cues such as price, on buyer's perceptions of quality. These studies suggest price is less likely to have a significant effect on consumer's perception of quality in the presence of other attributes and when buyers are familiar with the product or product category.
Another source of information for the consumer is the price history of the item that may help to define a range of prices for a particular item that is acceptable to consumers. This will be influenced of course by past purchases, perception of product benefits and perception of possible product costs based on previous experience (Berkman et al, 1997 ). There will be an upper bound on the range of prices i.e. the maximum the consumer is willing to pay -determined by the consumer's preferences and valuation of the item. There may also be a lower bound -especially if the consumer has imperfect information on the quality of the product. The consumer may be wary of something that is too cheap! As well as imperfect information, there may be other factors that influence the consumer's valuation of an item -particularly during an auction. Previous research in marketing has not addressed the conceptual distinction between buyer's behavior in an auction and outside of auctions, for example their emotional roles and profiles. From the consumer's point of view, there are substantial differences between buying in a store and buying at auctions, be it on the internet or on the auction floor, and buying at retail or wholesale. In the case when the product is on the market for a short period of time the environment more closely resembles classic supply and demand, with the buyers and sellers determining selling price based on a limited supply of goods (Harris, 1981) .
In some cases there is no product worth a specific "retail value". The ultimate price would be dependent of the extent of bidding. Consumers will also differ in bidding practices or on the basis of their experience (see Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1980; Feldman et al. 1983 ) Experienced buyers have their own tactics in bidding. It could well be that some buyers experience an 'emotional risk' while purchasing at auctions based on the intensity of their perception of the value of the product at that particular time. "Going, Going, Gone…"is the phrase for a lost opportunity for both the buyer and the seller.
How do these consumers react under pressure? In the case of the buyer it gives them that craving of urgency, you either buy it now or you may not get it later. The question remains whether the characteristics of the consumer, including their emotions during the auction, systematically affect prices, and auctioneer strategies, or whether they introduce "noise" into the auction?
Auctioneer Strategy
There are two components that will be considered here. First, the amount of information the auctioneer provides before the auction. Second the structure of the auction itself.
The main piece of information the auctioneer provides before the auction is the estimated price of the item. The theoretical literature about auctions suggests the auctioneer's best strategy is to provide truthful information about the value of the items being sold (Milgrom and Weber, 1982b) . Otherwise buyers find it difficult to make proper decisions about the absolute price of the item. Feldman & Reinhart (1996) suggest the gap between the highest bid and the 'true' value of the object decreases as the amount of information available increases. Supporting the theoretical literature, Ashenfelter (1989) suggests that auction houses make an effort to estimate the price that an item will fetch. Note a unique item normally requires considerable expertise so it is not unusual to find the auctioneer providing a high estimate and a low estimate in an auction catalogue.
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The argument that auctioneers provide unbiased estimates of item values has received considerable attention in the empirical literature. Ashenfelter (1989) , based on an empirical study of impressionist paintings in London and New York, finds price estimates are very highly correlated with the actual prices fetched and that they are very close to being unbiased estimates.
As highlighted by Louargand and McDaniel (1991) , this finding runs contrary to statements from auction house professionals that they consciously give price range estimates that are biased downwards so to encourage more bidders. Offsetting this is the need to suggest a high enough price to encourage the owner of the item to present it for sale. Louargand and McDaniel then argue that competition between auction houses should then yield efficient price estimates. Their analysis of price estimates and realized prices in auctions of Americana by Sotheby's New York auction rooms finds no significant difference between the estimated selling price and actual selling price. This suggests that professionals do not underestimate to a significant extent. Ekelund, Ressler and Watson (1998) in their investigation of the Latin-American art auction find both that in most cases, actual prices exceeded estimates, but that on average the percentage bias was positive i.e. Sotheby's and Christie's prices were overestimates.
The second main area where auctioneer strategy can influence outcomes is in the design of the auction. First, there are several different auction formats that can be used such as the English or ascending price auction, Dutch or descending price auction, first or discriminatory price auction and second or uniform price auction. In terms of raising revenue, the preferred auction depends on the characteristics of the buyers and sellers (Klemperer, 1998) . If both buyers and sellers are risk neutral, then most common types of auctions yield the same expected revenue for the seller. If buyers are risk averse then the first price type auction will yield a greater expected revenue.
There are other dimensions of the auction that the auctioneer may shape to influence the outcome. First, the auctioneer may place rules on the nature of bidding.
The choice of bidding often permits bidders the opportunity to communicate within the competitive structure of an English auction (Milgrom, 1998) . In the case of aggressive bidding or jump bidding intimidates consumers and discourages competition. Whereas, open exit bidding does not allow for jump bidding (Milgrom and Weber, 1982a) . Here the auctioneer raises the price incrementally. It is the consumer's willingness to bid based on the valuation of the object that determines the ultimate price.
Second, the auctioneer may seek to influence the number of bidders. Wilson (1977) argues that the greater the number of bidders, the closer the resulting prices to the actual value of the item. Empirical results of Nelson (1992) and, similarly, experiments of Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989) , Kagel & Levin (1986) , and Battalio, Kogut and Meyer (1990) indicate positive results between bid levels and the number of bidders.
Third, artificially, seller bids increase competition, conceals the actual number of bidders and help to take advantage of affiliated bidding (Mathews, 1983; Milgrom, 1986; . Considering this, buyers may tend to over bid, thus causing price distortions that may not permit accuracy in predicting results. Over bidding will result in the bid being greater than the consumer's valuation -known as the "winner's curse" and could result in post purchase dissonance. Post purchase dissonance could be experienced when pressure under competitive bidding increases consumer risk of suffering from the winner's curse. In some instances consumers are unaware of the winners curse (Bazerman, 2001 ).
Art Auctions
Notably, in the market for paintings, bids and offers reflect merit or esteem in which critics, art historians and connoisseurs hold a work of art. The value which the market places on works of paintings is consistent with the judgement that is made of their aesthetic quality, a term used to mean beauty, historical importance or any attribute other than price (Grampp, 1989) . The aesthetic components of a product are a potential source of pleasure for the consumer (Holbrook, 1995) . Though, there are a number of empirical studies of the arts in general, that covers the definition and scope of consumer aesthetics (Holbrook 1995; Lombardo 1991 Wohlwill 1981 . However, little has been done by the way of aesthetics and pricing to support theory development and to validate the implications of those theories.
As the art market becomes more extensive, consumers have more of a choice. A number of studies have indicated that the salience of specific products benefits or decision criteria play an important a role in consumer information acquisition, judgements and choices (Bettman and Sujan, 1987) (Huffman and Houston, 1993; Wright and Rip, 1980) . What instigates buying behavior for particular paintings is still unknown as much depends on the differences in subject matter; how it is perceived and the skill and originality is shown. The power to engage the viewer's interests, the name of the artist, quality of the visual experience or aesthetic merit all dictate different price ranges. Each work of art is unique in one way or other, perhaps by the way of aesthetic appeal or age or just the artist's name and that gives the seller of it some power over price. As Grampp (1989) has suggested the power obviously is greater if there are many rather than few buyers who want it. But buyers usually specialize which limits the demand for any one work, hence, limits the price setting power of the seller. The relation between seller and buyer is then a bargaining relation. All that can be said is that the price will be no less than what the seller will accept and no more than what the buyer will pay (Grampp, 1989) . Consumers have been hypothesized to have strong exploratory components include risk taking in making product choices (Cox, 1967; Cox et al., 1999) .
However, consumers that consider art as an investment are ready to risk bidding.
In extremes, there are two potential outcomes for art as an investment (Gramp, 1989) . If the art ceases to interest any one it will be discarded. About the art that survives, there is some but not much uncertainty about its future price. The demand for such art rises as real income rises, and its price also rises. He further suggests that the better informed is the art market, the more the price increase is limited by the rate of interest on assets that are equally risky. What is uncertain is which of the works of art created at any time will survive to have a price in the future. Experience shows that the longer a work of art has survived, the more likely is it to survive still longer and the more likely is its price to be higher in the future than at present. Though Grampp provides an appropriate understanding on the variability in time and price increases, much of this would depend on the preferences of buyers and the market trend. In other words, if art would not be considered as an investment then perhaps high bids would be restricted.
The Data and Econometric Framework
In this section we introduce the data used in this study. We use data from one auction held by a renowned Auctioneer and Valuer in Australia. We combine the information from the auctioneer's catalogue with a complete set of results of the auction.
After discussing the data we introduce the econometric framework within the analysis will be performed.
The Data
The auction was arranged as follows. It was of a single, diverse collection of Australian and European paintings, English and European silver, silver boxes and jewelry, English and European porcelain, jade, ivory and oriental porcelain and lastly English and European furniture, lights, clocks, bronzes and books. Besides being present at an auction bidding could be done via the telephone before the commencement of the auction or in absentee. All lots were offered and sold on "as is" basis. The highest bidder is the buyer. A buyers premium of 10% of the hammer price is payable to the auction house. In this paper, we focus on paintings. 159 of the 160 paintings offered for sale were sold.
The catalogue does more than just list the paintings for sales and their prices. An estimated range of prices (maximum and minimum) is provided for each painting. For some paintings there is also information such as a photograph of the item, the age of the painting and/or the painter, further information on the painting, including on its provenance, and previous exhibitions. They also provide information on the authenticity of the painting. There is not always information on the date of the paintings. There are two cases. First, there is detailed information on the painter, but not the painting. Where the dates of birth and death are known, the midpoint is used. Secondly, where the painter is obscure or the painting is attributed to a school then no age is recorded. It should also be noted that the catalogue itself is not just a sheet of paper with a list of paintings and prices. Rather it is a hardbound book with glossy paper and a cloth bookmark attached. It resembles a coffee table book, but with a few paintings on each page and with, of course, prices.
Some data on the characteristics of the paintings are summarized below in Table   One : AJ Sherman, AT Bernaldo (4), AE Streeton (7), HC Griffith (4), E Buckmaster, H Heysen, JA Turner (4), R Chamerski (7), JR Jackson (4), JH Scheltema, JA Cumbrae-Stewart (4), ME Rowan, NA Lindsay (4), RW Sturgess, WB Young, S Long (4), WR Bennett (4), R Johnson.
The Econometric Framework
Since we do not have any data on consumer characteristics we focus on the prices and the strategies used by the auctioneer. The main tool we use for this analysis is a hedonic regression of the price of a set of paintings on their characteristics because the realized prices are the result of the valuations of both the suppliers and demanders, we cannot directly infer consumer valuations of characteristics. The dependant and explanatory variables are summarized below in Table Two . 
The Econometric Analysis
As suggested in the previous section we consider two aspects related to auctions -auctioneer strategies and pricing. In each subsection a set of hypotheses are introduced and formally tested.
The Role of Auctioneer strategies in determining prices.
Three strategies by the auctioneer are considered. First, does the auctioneer provide unbiased estimates of the prices achieved in the auction? Second, does the information provided in the catalogue systematically affect pricing? Third, does the ordering of the items reflect a strategic intent?
As discussed earlier, there is a strong theoretical argument that the auctioneer should provide unbiased estimates of prices to potential bidders but there is only mixed evidence in support of this. To test if auctioneer provides unbiased estimates of prices achieved in the auction, we, following Chanel et al (1996) , regress the actual price, denoted P, on the estimated price, denoted P e . This is referred to as the Basic Regression. To test unbiasedness, we test if the coefficient on P e is significantly different from one. Rejection of the null hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to one means rejection of unbiasedness. The results of this (and subsequent regressions) are reported in Table Three : The estimated coefficient on Pe is significantly different from 1, so we reject the null hypothesis of unbiasedness. Before completely accepting this result, though, we are concerned about serial correlation in the error terms. This could result as consumers use information from early sales to adjust their estimates. However, using the Durbin
Watson statistic, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero first order serial correlation.
We also estimate a correllogram and use a Q-test (Ljung and Box's variation) to test for more general forms of serial correlation.
The Q-test (Ljung and Box's variation) suggests the autocorrelation coefficients at the second and third lags are significantly different from zero. This is suggestive of small second order autocorrelation -consistent with bidders bidding against the wind i.e. overbidding on one item is followed by underbidding on the following item. Second order serial correlation does not affect the estimated coefficients in the above regression but it does affect the standard errors. So we re-estimate the basic regression, adding an AR (2) error. The results are reported in the third column of Table Three . Again we reject the null hypothesis that the estimates are unbiased. Chanel et al (1996) also rejected unbiasedness in their auctions. They suggest this is strategic behavior by the auctioneer to attract buyers and increase competition for each painting. Strategic behaviour could make sense if auction participants do not go regularly to auctions. If auction houses systematically underestimate prices, regular auction goers will learn this and are unlikely to be fooled.
The second auctioneer strategy we consider is if the additional information, such as the photo of the picture and information on its provenance, exhibitions and other literature, influences prices. Producing such a fine catalogue undoubtedly increases the cost to the auctioneer. Indeed the fact that not all items get photos or additional information suggests some trade off between cost and anticipated benefit is taking place. So the effects cannot be interpreted as occurring solely on the consumer side.
This has not been tested in previous work on art auctions.
To test this hypothesis we run two hedonic regressions -one including a set of advertising related variables and the other excluding them. As the second is nested in the first, we can perform an F-test to test if the additional variables significantly improve the specification. An extract of the results of the full hedonic regression, with the Residual Sum of Squares are presented in Table Four . The coefficients of the hedonic regression are discussed in more detail below.
But for now we note that the signs and significance of the coefficients are satisfactory as is the overall explanatory power. For now, the test statistic shows the null hypothesis that the advertising variables have no significant effect is rejected. As the signs on all of the coefficients on the advertising variables are positive we conclude the effect of advertising is to increase prices. More information is required to conclude whether the increase in price is sufficient to cover costs.
The third strategy used by the auctioneer is to order paintings such that prices fall over the auction. Beggs and Graddy (1997) We follow Beggs and Graddy (1997) in first examining the raw data for such an effect. First, we divide the data according to deciles, as presented in Table Five . The median and mean estimates and bids by decile are summarized below in Table Five where the entries in parentheses are standard errors.
In the means, there is a less systematic pattern than the medians. The facts that the standard errors are so large and that the mean is consistently well above the mean suggests that the auctioneer has sprinkled expensive items throughout all of the deciles. This is consistent with desiring to keep excitement in the auction. However the medians document pretty clearly a broad pattern of rising and then falling, with a bit of a rise at the end.
The model of Beggs and Graddy (1997) also predicts a decline in the bid to estimate ratio. However, there is no systematic evidence of this happening. Beggs and Graddy (1997) is to examine the coefficient on an order variable in the hedonic regression. If the coefficient is significantly below zero this suggests some unobservable factor is determining this trend. If this coefficient is not significantly different from zero then this result is determined by the ordering of the paintings in terms of their observable qualities.
Examining Table Four we see the coefficient on lot number is not significantly different from zero. Hence, we conclude that the auctioneer is ordering the paintings in terms of their quality to achieve this outcome. However, the auctioneer is also mixing in paintings of higher value. This could be to maintain excitement.
Pricing
The second set of hypotheses is connected to pricing. The first two hypotheses examine the relationship between the auctioneer estimates and realized prices. We conclude with an analysis of the determinants of the realized prices, highlighted by the hedonic regression.
The first hypothesis is that the auctioneer forms its estimates more systematically than the prices achieved in the market -which was proposed in Chanel et al (1996) We follow Chanel et al (1996) here. They argue it is likely that experts providing valuations can provide more systematic estimates -in as far as they are related to the characteristics of the paintings, and then find evidence in support of this.
We are less convinced by this argument. In practice, multiple experts are often drawn on to provide forecasts of prices or other economic variables. If enough of the participants in the auction are informed, then reaching a price comes from a pooling of informed knowledge. This is offset to a certain extent by the winners curse. But it is not a foregone conclusion that the valuations by the auction house are going to be systematic.
To test this we follow Chanel et al (1996) . This is done as follows. We run hedonic regressions for both the realized prices and the estimated prices. We then calculate the ratio of the estimated variances of the residuals from the two regressions.
Both regressions are performed on Sample B. The estimated variances are presented below in Table Six . To formally test whether the auctioneer or the market make more systematic estimates of prices we perform a two-sided F-test on the ratio of variances.
The null hypothesis is that the variances are identical across the two regressions. If the variance from the regression on actual prices is significantly greater, then the auctioneer appears to estimate prices more systematically. But if the variance from the regression on actual prices is significantly lower, then the market yields more systematic estimates. The results of a two-sided F-test, even at 10% significance, are inconclusive.
Unlike Chanel et al (1996) , there is no evidence to suggest either the auctioneer or the market evaluates the information more systematically. Furthermore, it implies that the variances in the two regressions are identical. Heysen. Advertising has a significant effect with providing a picture in the catalog and some literature adding considerably to the value.
Conclusions
We find in this auction that the auctioneer appears to have systematically provided downwards-biased estimates of the prices. Placing additional information (advertising) in the catalogue is associated with higher realized prices. Furthermore, the auctioneer also orders the paintings roughly by quality. However, we find that the auctioneer does not price any more systematically (in terms of using information on the attributes of the paintings) than the market and that the two value different feature of paintings similarly.
This evidence is significant in several ways. First, unlike other studies, we have found systematic evidence supporting the anecdotal evidence that auctioneers shade their price estimates. This may be to attract consumers to the auction. Second, we have also found that including promotional material is correlated with higher realized prices, controlling for other features of the painting. A more sophisticated model would be required for working out the optimal amount of advertising, but this finding suggests that auctioneers should seriously consider using promotional material as well as pricing in promoting their auction. Finally, we have found evidence, consistent with other studies, that auctioneers systematically order their paintings, perhaps to deal with different consumer states of mind during an auction.
In addition, when considering the determinants of pricing, we found that larger paintings (of nudes or flowers) that have advertising in the catalogue tend to feature higher prices. Similarly, while there are premiums associated with painters that are household names -no premiums exist for lesser-known painters. We have considered the evidence from an auction of paintings and have found mixed evidence that support auctioneers using strategies highlighted in earlier work. We have also found some evidence on the determinants of prices of paintings.
Auction data provides a rich source for analyzing consumer behavior, auctioneer strategy and pricing and auctions. We argue that bidders use information provided by the auctioneer to determine their bids. Ideally, we would also like to have data on the characteristics of consumers, and a more complete account of their bidding behaviour so to enable a more complete analysis of auctioneer and consumer behaviour in auctions.
